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I. INTRODUCTION
Few academic doctrines can claim the intellectual and political success of
tax expenditure analysis. In roughly a generation's time,' Professor Surrey's
procedural and substantive critique of tax subsidies has become entrenched in
the law school curriculum2 and in legal scholarship. More impressively, the
tax expenditure concept has been enshrined in federal law4 and become part
of the daily discourse of the national budget process.-
In earlier articles, I have revisited the substantive tax expenditure
indictment of tax subsidies to suggest that the Surrey school's invariable
preference for direct government outlays is misplaced. While the classification
of particular features of the Internal Revenue Code as either normative or
subsidizing is critical to tax expenditure analysis, that classification cannot
t Visiting Professor of Law, Yale Law School; Professor of Law, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of
Law, Yeshiva University. I would like to express my thanks to those who commented on prior drafts of
this Article: Professors Stewart E. Sterk, Paul M. Shupack, Robert C. Ellickson, Jerry L. Mashaw, Daniel
A. Farber, Douglas Rae and Fred S. McChesney and the participants in a Yale Law School faculty seminar.
I also benefited from the research of Adam Frank, Yale Law School Class of 1993.
I. Professor Surrey developed the fundamental premises of tax expenditure analysis-the classification
of tax provisions as normative or subsidizing and the equivalence of the latter to direct spending-during
the later years of the Johnson Administration when serving as the Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for
Tax Policy. As an academic matter, his initial, influential statement of the ideas that became tax expenditure
analysis occurred in the late 1960's. See STANLEY S. SURREY, Tax Expenditures and the Budget, in TAX
POLICY AND TAX REFORM: 1961-1969, SELECTED SPEECHES AND TESTIMONY OF STANLEY S. SURREY 573
(William F. Hellmuth & Oliver Oldman eds., 1973); Stanley S. Surrey, Tax Incentives as a Device for
Implementing Government Policy: A Comparison with Direct Government Expenditures, 83 HARv. L. REV.
705 (1970) [hereinafter Surrey, Tax Incentives].
2. See, e.g., WILLIAM A. KLEIN ET AL., FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 24 (8th ed. 1990).
3. See, e.g., JOSEPH M. DODGE, THE LOGIC OF TAX: FEDERAL INCOME TAX THEORY AND POLICY 290
(1989). This is not to imply that the academic influence of tax expenditure analysis has been limited to
legal scholarship. See JOHN F. WITTE, THE POLITICS AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FEDERAL INCOME TAX
269 (1985).
4. See 2 U.S.C. § 640(c)(3) (1988) (adopted as part of Congressional Budget and Impoundment
Control Act of 1974, requiring promulgation of annual tax expenditure budget).
5. See, for example, the discussion of tax expenditures in President Bush's 1993 budget proposal.
Excerpts From President Bush's FY 1993 Budget Proposal, Submitted to Congress January 29, 1992, Daily
Tax Rep. (BNA) Special Supplement No. 2, at S-57 (Jan. 30, 1992).
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always be made with confidence.6 Moreover, the substantive case against tax
subsidies depends upon a comparison of such subsidies with an idealized
vision of direct spending.7 In theory, tax expenditures can be designed as
efficiently and progressively as programs using direct governmental outlays.
On the other hand, if we compare the messy realities of tax preferences with
the equally unattractive realities of direct expenditure programs, tax preferences
emerge better than most of the Surrey school would acknowledge. 8 Indeed, in
particular cases, a tax subsidy may be more efficient than an equivalent direct
spending program because such a subsidy uses the pre-existing tax system to
communicate federal policy at relatively low marginal cost.9 Thus, as a matter
of substantive policy, a certain agnosticism is in order: in some instances,
direct government outlays will be preferable to comparable tax expenditures;
in other cases, a subsidy through the Internal Revenue Code will be the
preferred means of implementing federal policy.
In this Article, I revisit the procedural aspects of the tax expenditure
critique to argue against that critique insofar as it is premised on the asserted
expertise of direct expenditure institutions. The core of my argument is that the
institutions formulating and administering tax policy are more competitive and
visible than their direct outlay counterparts because tax institutions are subject
to more numerous and diverse constituencies than the specialized, limited-
clientele organizations that design and implement direct government spending.
Tax institutions, because of their greater visibility and more competitive nature,
are less susceptible to interest group capture and possess greater legitimacy
under pluralist criteria than their direct expenditure equivalents. This
perspective leads to a form of agnosticism as well: the congressional
6. In particular, I have argued that the Code's present treatment of qualified plans is consistent with
the terms of a normative income tax and is therefore undeserving of characterization as a tax expenditure.
See Edward A. Zelinsky, The Tax Treatment of Qualified Plans: A Classic Defense of the Status Quo, 66
N.C. L. REV. 315 (1988) [hereinafter Zelinsky, Classic Defense]. I have also criticized the reflexive
classification as a tax subsidy of the deduction for certain state and local taxes. See Edward A. Zelinsky,
The Deductibility of State and Local Taxes: Income Measurement, Tax Expenditures and Partial,
Functional Deductibility, 6 AM. J. TAX POL'Y 9 (1987) [hereinafter Zelinsky, State and Local Taxes].
Professor Kahn has similarly suggested that accelerated depreciation may be consistent with the provisions
of a normative income tax. See Douglas A. Kahn, Accelerated Depreciation-Tax Expenditure or Proper
Allowance for Measuring Net Income?, 78 MICH. L. REV. 1 (1979). Professor Stein, on the other hand, has
vigorously contested my views, defending the classification as a tax subsidy of the Code's qualified plan
provisions. See Norman P. Stein, Qualified Plans and Tax Expenditures: A Reply to Professor Zelinsky,
9 AM. J. TAX POL'Y 225 (1991); Edward A. Zelinsky, Qualified Plans and Identifying Tax Expenditures:
A Rejoinder to Professor Stein, 9 AM J. TAX POL'Y 257 (1991) [hereinafter Zelinsky, Rejoinder]; see also
Douglas A. Kahn & Jeffery S. Lehman, Tax Expenditure Budgets: A Critical View, 54 TAX NOTES 1661,
1664 (1992) ("1Vlery few items fit neatly into" categories of normative and subsidizing); Victor Thuronyi,
Tax Expenditures: A Reassessment, 1988 DUKE L.J. 1155, 1156 (1988) (introducing "substitutable tax
provisions" concept).
7. Edward A. Zelinsky, Efficiency and Income Taxes: The Rehabilitation of Tax Incentives, 64 TEX.
L. REV. 973 (1986).
8. For example, the complexity of direct expenditure programs places the complexities of tax subsidies
in a different light. Edward A. Zelinsky, The Tax Reform Act of 1986: A Response to Professor Yorio and
His Vision of the Future of the Internal Revenue Code, 55 FORDHAM L. REV. 885, 892-93 (1987).
9. Zelinsky, supra note 7, at 1010.
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committees that design and the administrative agencies that implement tax
subsidies may, in particular cases, be preferable to their direct expenditure
counterparts.
To develop my argument, I will initially review the procedural case against
tax preferences and will then contrast the expertise-based premise of this
perspective with the Madisonian/public choice/pluralist tradition in American
political thought, a tradition that focuses, not upon the asserted proficiencies
of policymakers, but upon the interplay of competing interest groups in the
political process. I will then elaborate my argument about the differences
between the administrative agencies and congressional committees that
formulate and implement direct expenditure programs and the equivalent tax
organizations. As part of this argument, I will present the results of empirical
research in support of my position-research focusing upon patterns of
congressional campaign contributions, relative quantities of largesse channeled
through the direct expenditure and tax systems, and patterns of press coverage
of tax and direct expenditure organizations.'1 I will then consider possible
objections to my defense of tax institutions as more pluralist and less
capturable as well as necessary qualifications of and refinements to my thesis,
and will conclude by discussing the tax policy and constitutional implications
of my analysis.
Let me emphasize at the outset, what I am not saying: I am not suggesting
that the institutions that design and implement the tax law are immune from
capture by interest groups or perfectly implement the pluralist model of
democracy. I am not declaring that, in all cases, a tax subsidy is better
designed and administered than its direct expenditure counterpart or that the
interplay of interest groups mechanically dictates legislative and administrative
outcomes: ideology, accident, history, inertia, partisanship, public opinion,
cultural norms, bureaucratic aggrandizement, the idiosyncrasies of legislators
and the legislative process, and the personalities and proclivities of individual
decisionmakers, as well as their concern for the public interest, all affect the
outcomes of political and administrative processes. The procedures by which
taxes are designed and administered are not ideal or pretty or inhabited
exclusively by the pure of heart.
I am suggesting that, in the long term, institutional differences of the sort
I explore below do systematically affect legislative and bureaucratic outcomes
for better and for worse. A defense of the tax system along these lines
constitutes an important counterweight to the widespread, contemporary
disillusionment with that system."
10. This research is presented and discussed more fully in the Appendix, infra p.1195.
I1. The analysis developed here contrasts with my earlier views on this subject. In particular, I did
not appreciate the greater susceptibility to capture of the specialized nontax committees of Congress and
the corresponding advantages of the tax-writing process. For my earlier comments on the issue of capture,
see Edward A. Zelinsky, Greenmail, Golden Parachutes and the Internal Revenue Code: A Tax Policy
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II. THE PROCEDURAL CASE AGAINST TAX EXPENDITURES:
THE EXPERTISE OF DIRECT EXPENDITURE INSTITUTIONS
In its original incarnation, the procedural critique of tax subsidies
embodied two basic concerns: that such subsidies, undisclosed in the federal
budget, were not subject to the same scrutiny as direct monetary expenditures,
and that such subsidies, designed and implemented by congressional tax-writers
and the Department of the Treasury, were not formed or administered using the
specialized subject matter expertise of the other committees of Congress and
the nontax executive departments.
The first part of this critique gave rise to the proposal for the tax
expenditure budget, the annual identification, as part of the federal
government's regular budgetary process, of the subsidies contained in the
Internal Revenue Code and of their projected costs. Today, the preparation of
such a budget is required by statute.12 Not surprisingly, much political and
academic attention has been devoted to determining the items properly
included in the yearly tax expenditure budget and the revenues foregone as a
result of such items.'
3
While the tax expenditure school had quick (and, I think, useful)
14
success in persuading Congress of the need for an annual tax expenditure
budget, it has had less impact vis-d-vis the second element of its procedural
critique, i.e., the failure, in the design and implementation of tax preferences,
to utilize the subject matter expertise of the nontax congressional committees
and executive departments. Professor Yorio expressed the concern in these
terms:
The process by which tax subsidies are enacted and administered also
increases the risk that they would fail a cost-benefit test. To begin
with, a tax subsidy enters the Code after review primarily by the
House Ways and Means Committee and the Senate Finance
Committee. Charged principally with matters of tax and finance, both
committees are usually less informed about the specifics of the
problems justifying government intervention than those Congressional
committees that grapple regularly with the problems. Moreover, the
duty of administering tax subsidies is left to the Internal Revenue
Critique of Sections 280G, 4999 and 5881, 35 VILL. L. REV. 131, 191-92 (1990).
12. The Congressional Budget Act of 1974, mandating the preparation of an annual tax expenditure
budget, Congressional Budget and Impoundment Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-344, § 308, 88 Stat. 297, 313
(1974) (current version at 2 U.S.C. § 639(c)(3) (1988)), was adopted four years after Professor Surrey's
article appeared in the Harvard Law Review. Surrey, Tax Incentives, supra note 1.
13. See, e.g., Kahn & Lehman, supra note 6; Michael J. McIntyre, A Solution to the Problem of
Defining a Tax Expenditure, 14 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 79 (1980); Zelinsky, Rejoinder, supra note 6;
Zelinsky, Classic Defense, supra note 6; Zelinsky, State and Local Taxes, supra note 6.
14. Despite my reservations about the classification of items as normative or subsidizing, I believe that
on balance, the tax expenditure budget has improved the quality of tax discussion and policymaking,
forcing greater scrutiny of the Code and proposals to change it.
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Service (IRS), which generally has no particular expertise with respect
to the problem that the preference was enacted to remedy. Although
it may be theoretically possible for the relevant tax committees and
the IRS to obtain and digest the information required to make a
rational cost-benefit decision about a specific tax expenditure, the
process of education and learning is likely to be haphazard and
incomplete. As a practical matter, it is virtually impossible for two
congressional committees and one administrative agency to master the
plethora and diversity of proposals for using the Code to accomplish
societal goals.'5
From one vantage point, this critique is easily remedied by making the
enactment and implementation of tax preferences a joint undertaking of the
relevant tax and nontax institutions. Subsidies implemented through the Code
can, before or after passage by the Ways and Means and Finance Committees,
be submitted to additional expert review by the proper subject matter
committees of Congress. 6 Congress can-and, on occasion, does-provide
for the joint administration of particular tax subsidies by the IRS and the
appropriate nontax administrative agency, 17 thus utilizing the specialized
expertise of the nontax agency in the implementation of the tax subsidy.'8
15. Edward Yorio, Equity, Efficiency, and the Tax Reform Act of 1986,55 FORDHAM L. REV. 395,425
(1987) (citations omitted); see also STANLEY S. SURREY & PAUL R. McDANIEL, TAX EXPENDITURES 106-
07 (1985) (The Treasury and IRS typically "lack expertise on the subject matter" of tax expenditures as
do "the tax committees" of Congress.); E.C. Lashbrooke, Jr., An Economic and Constitutional Case for
Repeal of the .R.C. Section 170 Deduction for Charitable Contributions to Religious Organizations, 27
DUQ. L. REV. 695, 700 (1989) (Tax expenditure "activity unnecessarily burdens the Service... in areas
in which the Service does not have the requisite expertise"); Thuronyi, supra note 6, at 1161 ("Tax
expenditures.. . are administered by the Internal Revenue Service (IRS), an agency unfamiliar with the
substantive problems addressed by subsidies...."); Edward Yorio, The Future of Tax Reform: A Rejoinder
to Professor Zelinsky, 55 FORDHAM L. REV. 899, 904 (1987) ("[U]ntil Congress actually reforms its
procedures (to provide for nontax committee review of proposed tax expenditures] tax incentives are
unlikely to be as carefully crafted and controlled as direct subsidies."). For an earlier statement of Professor
Surrey's procedural concerns, see STANLEY S. SURREY, PATIvAYS TO TAX REFORM, THE CONCEPT OF
TAX EXPENDITURES 141-46 (1973).
16. See Zelinsky, supra note 8, at 891. Such joint review assumes agreement as to the identification
of tax provisions that are subsidizing rather than normative.
17. For example, under the low-income housing credit established in Section 42, important
administrative functions are assigned to the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development and the
U.S. Department of Agriculture. See I.R.C. §§ 42(d)(5)(C)(ii), 42(d)(6) (1992). Similarly, state employment
agencies play significant roles in the implementation of the targeted jobs credit of Section 51, while the
Department of Agriculture has important responsibilities in the administration of Section 126, which
excludes from income certain benefits received from government programs. See I.R.C. §§ 51(d), 126(b)
(1992).
Such joint administration by tax and nontax agencies is not without its problems. Dissatisfaction with
the joint implementation of federal pension policy by the Departments of the Treasury and Labor has led
to repeated complaints including suggestions for the creation of a single, pension-related agency at the
national level. See, e.g., Joanna Richardson, Aging Committee Seeks Coordinated, 'Proactive' Approach
To ERISA Enforcement, 54 TAX NOTES 678 (1992). The point, however, remains: if we conclude that tax
expenditures should be administered using the expertise of nontax agencies, the expenditures can be
designed in a fashion providing for joint implementation.
18. Such cooperation by tax and nontax institutions looks less benign to me now in light of the
problems of capture discussed later in this Article. See hifra notes 43-47, 64-71 and accompanying text.
Professors Surrey and McDaniel reject the joint development and implementation of tax expenditures on
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More generally, the expertise critique of tax expenditure institutions can
be understood as a tactical argument in an effort to purify the tax code, a
classic lawyers' strategem of talking procedure to avoid substance. The critique
of tax organizations and their alleged subject matter deficiencies provides a
procedural rationale for abolishing any particular tax subsidy without
addressing the subsidy's substantive merits, assuring the proponents of the
subsidy that their concerns can be addressed by the mandarins of the direct-
spending system.
The expertise indictment of tax preferences can also be understood as a
normative prescription for efficacious government under the assumption that
a decision has been made to commit a given number of dollars to a particular
area. Presuming a determination to spend a specific amount of money to
address a specific problem, that money, the argument suggests, will be
allocated and disbursed more efficiently and professionally by the
knowledgeable personnel of direct-spending institutions rather than the
generalists of the tax system. Paradoxically, the expertise critique can be
viewed simultaneously as a formula for reducing government outlays: the
specialists inhabiting direct expenditure organizations will more effectively
scrutinize, and therefore eliminate, unwarranted spending within their
respective jurisdictions than will less informed tax decisionmakers. The
paradoxical nature of tax expenditure analysis is an important element in its
success; the analysis both assures proponents of active government that public
outlays can be made through direct spending and appeals to conservatives as
a formula for reduced government activity."
On the most fundamental level, the expertise critique of tax expenditures
invokes the important notion in American political culture that disinterested,
"trained, nonpartisan experts [can] best manage the subtle and difficult social
questions of the modem world.,, 20 From this vantage point, Professor Surrey's
procedural case for the subject matter proficiency of nontax institutions is an
appeal to the managerial and technocratic values underpinning such expert-
oriented institutions as civil service systems, independent regulatory agencies,
and municipal governments run by city managers. Professor Surrey's
perspective is thus firmly rooted in the tradition of Progressive, New Deal, and
good government reformers who placed great confidence in the processes and
outcomes of professional decisionmaking-a tradition which, in Professor
the ground that such cooperation is likely to be "incomplete and cumbersome ... produc[ing] delay and
confusion rather than cooperative activity." SURREY & MCDANIEL, supra note 15, at 106-107. Skepticism
about the potential for cooperation among tax and nontax institutions was, from the beginning, part of
Professor Surrey's critique of tax expenditures. See SURREY, supra note 15, at 141-42 (cooperation between
Congress' tax and nontax committees "is awkward and leaves unanswered questions").
19. Zelinsky, supra note 8, at 888 n.26; Zelinsky, supra note 7, at 1021.
20. LEwis L. GOULD, REFORM AND REGULATION, AMERICAN POLITICS FROM ROOSEVELT TO WILSON
210 (2d ed. 1986).
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Banfield's apt, but wary, description, seeks "to replace politicians with
experts.'
III. INTEREST GROUP THEORY: MADISON, PLURALISM, PUBLIC CHOICE,
AND MONITORING POLITICAL AGENTS
James Madison, in contrast, was skeptical of institutional arrangements that
presume "[e]nlightened statesmen will . . . always be at the helm" of
government.22 For Madison, self-government is not a matter of entrusting
public authority to experts but, rather, of coping with the inevitable "spirit of
party and faction in the necessary and ordinary operations of government."
23
That spirit, if uncontrolled, leads to instability, oppression, and disregard of
"the public good... in the conflicts of rival parties."
2 4
For Madison, the ideal polity was competitive with a "variety of parties
and interests."5 A diversity of interests, Madison argued,
make[s] it less probable that a majority of the whole will have a
common motive to invade the rights of other citizens; or if such a
common motive exists, it will be more difficult for all who feel it to
discover their own strength and to act in unison with each other.26
In much contemporary discussion,27 Madison's concerns are echoed in the
vocabulary of public choice, the academic discipline which "employs the
analytic tools of economics" 28 to understand and evaluate political processes.
An important variant of this perspective "conceives regulation as a service
supplied to effective political interest groups."29
21. EDWARD C. BANFIELD, HERE THE PEOPLE RULE 170 (2d ed. 1991). In a similarly skeptical vein,
Professor Wildavsky has discussed the premise of expert decisionmaking which underpinned the executive
budget movement. AARON B. WILDAVSKY, THE NEW POLITICS OF THE BUDGETARY PROCESS 53 (1988).
22. See THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 80 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
23. Id. at 79.
24. Id. at 77.
25. Id. at 83.
26. Id.
27. This is not to suggest, as some of the public choice literature implies, that, between Madison and
the emergence of the modem public choice school, no one recognized the importance of self-interest and
clientele groups in the political process. For example, the young Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. observed that
"in the last resort a man rightly prefers his own interest to that of his neighbors. And this is as true in
legislation as in any other form of corporate action .... The more powerful interests must be more or less
reflected in legislation .... " LIVA BAKER, THE JUSTICE FROM BEACON HILL: THE LIFE AND TIMES OF
OLIVER WENDELL HOLmES 214 (1991). More jocularly, but at least as seriously, Ambrose Bierce defined
politics as a "strife of interests masquerading as a contest of principles. The conduct of public affairs for
private advantage." Bruce Watson, Who Was it Wrote the Devil's Dictionary, SMITHSONIAN, Mar. 1992,
at 104.
28. DENNIS C. MUELLER, PUBLIC CHOICE 2 (1979); see also Daniel A. Farber, Free Speech Without
Romance: Public Choice and the First Amendment, 105 HARv. L. REV. 554, 555 (1991) (defining public
choice theory as "the application of economics methodology to political institutions").
29. Richard A. Posner, Theories of Economic Regulation, 5 BELL J. ECON. MGMT. SCI. 335, 356
(1974). Judge Posner's article and Professor Stigler's earlier work remain the seminal statements in this
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Public choice analysis-emphasizing the rent-seeking nature of interest
group activity, the incentives of political entrepreneurs to supply such groups,
collective action problems which prevent the effective organization of the
public at large, and the capture of legislatures and administrative agencies by
organized, concentrated constituencies 3° -reinforces Madison's preference for
competitive political processes that pit diverse and conflicting groups against
one another. While it is possible in a Madisonian process for interests to
respond to their situation collusively rather than competitively, attempting to
satisfy their respective needs by combining into broad, mutually useful
coalitions, nevertheless, insofar as the legislative or administrative environment
approaches Madison's ideal, the presence of more diverse and numerous
interest groups discourages such logrolling: more heterogeneous groups will
find it more difficult to negotiate mutually acceptable positions for a common
front; more numerous groups will find it more costly to bargain with one
another and more difficult to detect and prevent defection from and freeloading
on the coalition.'
In the terminology of economics, conflict among rent-seeking interest
groups reduces effective demand for government subsidy because collective
action costs decrease the ability of such interest groups to form working
majorities in the political arena. As a matter of supply, such conflict constrains
the quantum of government largesse that politicians and bureaucrats can
furnish to any one group since the subsidy supplied to one contending group
will be perceived as coming at the expense of the others.32
Madison's analysis of faction and the economic theory of regulation both
portray organized constituencies in essentially negative terms. More benign is
the pluralist perspective on interest groups, a perspective which envisions such
groups as legitimate and useful participants in public life. At least as early as
deToqueville, commentators have lauded the tendency of Americans to
area. See George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. EcON. MGT. So. 3 (1971).
Judge Posner does not explicitly label his approach a public choice analysis. However, his article
unreservedly adopts the chief assumption of public choice theory: "the general assumption of economics
that human behavior can best be understood as the response of rational self-interested beings to their
environment must have extensive application to the political process." Posner, supra, at 356.
30. See JAMES M. BUCHANAN & GORDON TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT 284-87 (1962);
RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 497-98 (3d ed. 1986). For a concise presentation of
the major conclusions of the public choice literature, see William N. Eskridge, Jr., Politics Without
Romance: Implications of Public Choice Theory for Statutory Interpretation, 74 VA. L. REV. 275, 285
(1988); see also, Robert D. Tollison, Public Choice and Legislation, 74 VA. L. REV. 339 (1988).
31. See, e.g., BUCHANAN & TULLOCK, supra note 30, at 132 (labelling logrolling as "the commonly
employed American term" to describe "vote-trading"); see also MUELLER, supra note 28, at 49-58. While
the term "logrolling" has today come to denote cooperative behavior through the exchange of mutual
support, the game of logrolling was not historically a collaborative enterprise but, rather, a sport in which
the goal was to force one's opponent off the log into the water. See 2 ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA 234
(15th ed. 1990) (describing "birling," a lumberjack sport).
32. For a good summary of the literature on interest group theory and the capture of legislative and
administrative institutions, see Einer R. Elhauge, Does Interest Group Theory Justify More Intrusive
Review?, 101 YALE L.J. 31, 35 (1991).
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organize themselves into voluntary associations for mutual protection and
welfare.33 From the benevolent, pluralist vantage point, such associations
properly represent the diverse members of the body politic and play an
appropriate and constructive role in the formulation of public policy in a
democratic polity.34 In Professor Lowi's terms:
Since the days of Madison the pluralist view has been that there is
nothing to fear from government so long as many factions compete
for its favor. Modem pluralism turned the Madisonian position from
negative to positive; that is, government is good because many
factions do compete for its favor.35
A comparatively new body of academic research, focusing on the
principal/agent relationship, reinforces the normative preference for pluralistic
political processes. Contemporary agency scholarship has largely directed its
attention to monitoring issues in private sector agency relationships, in
particular to the costs and difficulties of shareholder oversight of management
behavior.36 However, the concerns raised in the contemporary agency
literature have, as some political scientists recognize, 37  significant
ramifications for the understanding of governmental processes as well:
relatively closed processes, less visible to some groups or to the general public
than to other groups, are more easily captured by the interests that can readily
monitor those processes and therefore intelligently punish and reward such
processes' decisionmakers. Conversely, more visible institutions, subject to
effective oversight by numerous and diverse interests and by the public as a
whole, are less prone to capture by any particular clientele since competing
interests and the general public are all watching.
33. ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 485-88 (J.P. Mayer & Max Lerner eds. &
George Lawrence trans., 1966).
34. Jack M. Beermann, Interest Group Politics and Judicial Behavior: Macey's Public Choice, 67
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 183, 188 (1991) ("'[Plluralism' ... portrays the ability of people to band together
and press their interests to government as a strength of an open and democratic system.").
35. THEODORE J. LOWI, THE END OF LIBERALISM 35 (2d ed. 1979); see also TERRY M. MOE, THE
ORGANIZATION OF INTERESTS (1980); WrITE, supra note 3, at 8 (defining a pluralistic system as one
characterized by, inter alia, "numerous, diverse and autonomous interests," and by competition between
elites over questions of public policy and access to public office); Eskridge, supra note 30, at 281 ("After
World War H, the prevailing political theory was an optimistic pluralism tied to Madison's ideas."); Daniel
Shaviro, Beyond Public Choice and Public Interest: A Study of the Legislative Process as Illustrated by
Tar Legislation in the 1980s, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 33 (1990).
36. For the seminal work of the new agency scholarship, see Michael C. Jensen & William H.
Meckling, The Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN.
ECON. 305 (1976). For other contributions to this scholarship, see PRINCIPALS AND AGENTS: THE
STRUCTURE OF BUSINESS (John W. Pratt & Richard J. Zeckhauser eds., 1985); Frank H. Easterbrook &
Daniel R. Fischel, Close Corporations and Agency Costs, 38 STAN. L. REV. 271 (1986); Hideki Kanda &
Saul Levmore, Taxes, Agency Costs, and the Price of Incorporation, 77 VA. L. REV. 211 (1991).
37. See Joseph P. Kalt & Mark A. Zupan, The Apparent Ideological Behavior of Legislators: Testing
for Principal-Agent Slack in Political Institutions, 33 J.L. & ECON. 103 (1990) [hereinafter Kalt & Zupan,
Ideological Behavior]; Joseph P. Kalt & Mark A. Zupan, Capture and Ideology in the Economic Theory
of Politics, 74 AM. ECON. REV. 279, 298 (1984) [hereinafter Kalt & Zupan, Capture].
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Madison's view of organized constituencies, some would assert, is overly
pessimistic, ignoring the possibility (and the reality) that "factions" can (and
do) play a constructive role in the body politic. Similarly, economic theory in
general,38 and the economic theory of regulation 39 in particular, can be
attacked as impoverished and incomplete, disregarding the nonmaterial
motivations of groups and individuals as well as the malleable nature of human
preferences: elected and appointed officials may be ideologically inspired or
may seek to pursue the public welfare as they perceive it rather than to satiate
special interests; human beings, individually and in association with one
another, have psychological needs, religious beliefs and philosophical agendas
independent of, and sometimes contrary to, their economic prosperity;
individuals' preferences may be inchoate, inconsistent or incomplete. Pluralism
can similarly be challenged as excessively optimistic, blind to the unpleasant
realities of collective behavior in political systems.n
By way of response, I would observe that not all of these criticisms can
be true all of the time: if pluralism is essentially wrong, then Madison is
substantially right and vice versa. Moreover, economic models of human
behavior seem particularly appropriate in the context of tax and budgetary
issues which, by their nature, are primarily economic in character. Furthermore,
from the perspective I advance, it is not necessary that any (or all) of the
interest group theories explain exhaustively all political behavior;41 it is
merely necessary to start with their common teaching that political institutions
38. See Robert C. Ellickson, Bringing Culture and Human Frailty to Rational Actors: A Critique of
Classical Law and Economics, 65 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 23 (1989). For an alternative response to some of
the criticisms of the law and economics movement, see Susan Rose-Ackerman, Progressive Law and
Economics-and the New Administrative Law, 98 YALE L.J. 341 (1988).
39. See, e.g., BANFIELD, supra note 21, at 373-95 (criticizing an economic approach to politics on the
grounds, inter alia, that critical economic assumptions such as "given preferences" and "profit-maximizing
... measured in money terms" are inapplicable to political behavior); Mark Kelman, On Democracy-
Bashing: A Skeptical Look at the Theoretical and "Empirical" Practice of the Public Choice Movement,
74 VA. L. REV. 199 (1988); Deborah M. Weiss, Paternalistic Pension Policy: Psychological Evidence and
Economic Theory, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 1275, 1301 (1991) ("A growing body of laboratory evidence
suggests that many human subjects make dynamically inconsistent choices. The most commonly accepted
explanation for this phenomenon is that individual preferences are not stable.").
40. Professors Buchanan and Tullock, for example, are skeptical of the claims of pluralist
commentators. See BUCHANAN & TULLOCK, supra note 30, at 288-89 (notwithstanding the claims advanced
for "pluralistic organization .... [g]iven any collective decisionmaking rule other than that of unanimity,
external costs will tend to be imposed by collective action."); see also WIrrTE, supra note 3, at 136
(outlining the "persistent critiques" of "the incremental/pluralist model.")
41. Indeed, most proponents of public choice theory are careful to eschew any claim that such theory,
by itself, supplies a complete explanation for all political behavior. See, e.g., Farber, supra note 28, at 557
("Public choice theory is useful, but it cannot purport to be more than a partial explanation for political
behavior .... "); Dwight R. Lee, Politics, Ideology, and the Power of Public Choice, 74 VA. L. REV. 191,
198 (1988) ("Public choice provides only one window through which to view the political process. Any
serious attempt to understand political phenomena requires the view from many windows."). By the same
token, those skeptical of the economic theory of regulation are usually careful to note that the theory
accurately predicts some political behavior. See Kalt & Zupan, Ideological Behavior, supra note 37, at 128
("ideology [as] residual" factor affecting the behavior of "(marginally) uncaptured legislators"); Kalt &
Zupan, Capture, supra note 37, at 298 ("[llt appears that the proximity of the next election inhibits
ideological shirking: senators shirk less as the policemen approach.").
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influenced by more numerous and more diverse groups are preferable to
governmental organizations influenced by more limited and more homogeneous
constituencies.
I would, moreover, acknowledge that not even this premise is beyond
cavil. The greater independence of the Secretary of the Treasury from
offsetting interest groups is not a blessing if the Secretary uses his
independence to pursue questionable objects.42 Likewise, members of the
Ways and Means and Finance Committees may utilize their relative freedom
from particular constituencies in a fashion that makes interest group capture
preferable.
It is thus important to reiterate the asymmetry between the invariable
preference of the Surrey school for direct monetary expenditures and my more
agnostic perspective. I am not advancing a countermyth that the processes that
formulate and administer tax subsidies are invariably superior to their direct
expenditure counterparts. In particular cases, the benefits flowing from the
expertise of a nontax committee or of a direct expenditure department may
reasonably be perceived as outweighing the correlative dangers of capture.
There are also cases where susceptibility to capture is a desired quality,
ensuring an intended responsiveness of governmental arrangements to a
favored clientele: a grateful nation might rationally prefer veterans institutions
beholden and therefore responsive to those who served in the armed services
rather than veterans programs administered with less partiality by the IRS or
evaluated with less solicitude by the tax committees. The larger points of this
Article are that the trade-off between expertise and capture exists, that the
choices this trade-off presents should not be ignored simply by asserting the
superior expertise of direct expenditure institutions and that, in some instances,
the greater independence and visibility of tax-writers and administrators will
be preferable to the alleged subject matter proficiency of their more
specialized, capturable counterparts in the direct expenditure system.
IV. THE MADISONIAN NATURE OF TAX INSTITUTIONS
For purposes of the Surrey critique, we can view tax and direct
expenditure policy as formulated and administered in four stages. Initially, the
congressional committees design and authorize programs within their respective
jurisdictions. Next, the full houses of Congress act on the committees' product.
Third, the President approves or disapproves the decision of the House and
42. Professor Beermann makes a similar point in connection with the frequently asserted proposition
that judges ought to counteract the effects of interest group capture. Judges, he argues, may not necessarily
use their independence in desirable ways. Beermann, supra note 34, at 221-22.
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Senate. Finally, the appropriate executive department executes the program
agreed upon by Congress and the President.43
The tax expenditure procedural critique is aimed at the first and fourth
stages of this process. At the first stage, the critique asserts that the nontax
committees of Congress possess expertise due to their specialization in
particular subject matters.# This expertise is utilized in the formulation of
direct spending programs but is not used in the formulation of tax subsidies
since such subsidies are designed by the Ways and Means and Finance panels,
generalist bodies with less opportunity and less inclination to acquire subject
matter proficiency than the narrowly focused nontax committees of Congress.
A similar analysis applies at the fourth stage of the policy process. Direct
outlay programs are administered by specialized executive departments which,
it is argued, develop great understanding of the programs they implement and
the problems those programs address. In contrast, the Treasury and the IRS,
distracted by the need to run the tax system, do not develop comparable
expertise as to the subsidies confided to their administration.
The Madisonian/public choice/pluralist perspective suggests that this
critique romanticizes the congressional committees that design, and the
executive departments that administer, direct spending programs while ignoring
the benefits of the more competitive processes through which taxes are
formulated and implemented. The specialized orientation of the nontax
committees and departments makes each of these institutions highly susceptible
to capture by the limited constituencies affected by its comparatively narrow
jurisdiction. In pluralist terms, the outcomes emanating from direct expenditure
committees and departments possess less legitimacy than if more numerous and
43. I realize this highly simplified description fails to capture many nuances and complexities of the
process. For example, the story of the third, presidential stage is, technically and substantively, more
complicated than this: the President may veto and be overriden by both houses of Congress; his presence
and preferences will affect the decisions of Congress and its committees in the two earlier stages. However,
for purposes of the critique advanced by Professor Surrey and my response, this is a workable model from
which to proceed. Moreover, the fourth, administrative stage of the process should not be dismissed as
ministerial in nature. Executive interpretation and implementation of legislation can have important
substantive implications for the parties affected by that legislation and for the public fise. The relevant
executive department is also an important actor in the initiation, review and modification of existing and
proposed programs. Indeed, a department's advocacy, protection or opposition may be decisive in the
legislative response to particular programs and proposals. Hence, these four stages ought to be envisioned,
not in linear terms, but as a loop-the performance and evaluation of the executive department affecting
the decisions of the committees and houses of Congress. The role of executive departments in the
formulation of legislative policy is captured in the oft-used metaphor of the "iron triangle," a symbiotic
relationship among congressional committees, executive departments and the relevant constituencies. See,
e.g., WILDAVSKY, supra note 21, at 17 (The "mutually supportive, three-point relationship among
committee members, interest groups, and agencies.., have been called iron triangles."); Beermann, supra
note 34, at 192 (referring to the relationship among Congress, agencies, and groups as an "Iron Triangle");
Rudolph G. Penner, Federal Government Growth: Leviathan or Protector of the Elderly?, 44 NAT'L TAX
J. 437, 446 (1991) ("There may be a grain of truth" to the "so-called 'Iron Triangle'....").
44. Presumably this expertise is developed by both committee staff and the members of the committee
themselves.
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more diverse groups were to participate in the deliberations of these
institutions.
Consider, for example, the case of agriculture. Many provisions of the
Internal Revenue Code can quite comfortably be classified as subsidies for the
farm industry.45 The tax expenditure procedural critique suggests that, as a
matter of process, such subsidies should not be designed in Congress' tax-
writing committees because these bodies lack the expertise to formulate farm
policy. Instead, the agriculture committees should develop farm programs using
direct outlays of government funds.
However, within the farm committees there are generally not significant
countervailing pressures from nonagricultural constituencies, while in the Ways
and Means and Finance panels agricultural interests are forced to contend with
the competing pressures of other groups also seeking largesse from the public
fisc. While the farm lobbies at times have important conflicts among
themselves, they also have significant areas of agreement, particularly in
comparison with the nonagricultural interests with which farm groups must
contend in the tax panels. In the relatively confined settings of the agricultural
committees, the limited number of farm constituencies have a comparatively
easy time organizing themselves into a working majority. This contrasts with
the more competitive environments of the Finance and Ways and Means
Committees in which the number and heterogeneity of different interests make
logrolling more difficult. In short, agricultural interests can more easily capture
the agriculture committees than the tax-writing committees. In pluralist terms,
the decisions of the tax panels possess greater legitimacy than those of the
agriculture committees because more numerous and more diverse clienteles
shape the former than the latter.
Similarly, the procedural indictment of tax preferences contends that, in the
implementation of agricultural subsidies through the Code, the IRS lacks the
expertise of the Department of Agriculture. However, in the administration of
farm subsidies, the Secretary of the Treasury possesses greater independence
from farm interests than the Secretary of Agriculture. The Secretary of
Agriculture relies on farm lobbies to support his policy agenda and his
department's budget. He and his subordinates may have worked with
agricultural interests before appointment and may return to agriculture after
government service. When a Secretary of Agriculture proposes to abolish farm
subsidies, he strikes at the very rationale for his agency's existence. The
Secretary of the Treasury, on the other hand, is subject to more varied and
offsetting constituencies and therefore possesses greater independence from any
particular constituency. He and his aides are not likely to have a prior
45. For example, a number of farm assets are singled out statutorily for particularly rapid cost
recovery: certain horses, I.R.C. § 168(e)(3)(A) (1992), certain agricultural and horticultural structures, I.R.C.
§ 168(e)(3)(D)(i) (1992), and fruit- and nut-bearing trees and vines, I.R.C. § 168(e)(3)(D)(ii) (1992).
Similarly, qualifying family farms enjoy estate tax benefits. I.R.C. § 2032A (1992).
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background in agriculture or to seek agricultural employment after tenure in
office. When the Secretary of the Treasury suggests the abolition of farm
subsidies, he is not potentially putting himself out of a job: there will be plenty
of work for the Treasury even under a Code totally purged of tax expenditures.
In the vocabulary of the economic theory of regulation, the Department of
Agriculture and Congress' farm committees supply industry-specific servic-
es-agricultural subsidies-to a limited number of buyers-farm interests. In
contrast, the Treasury and Congress' tax-writers supply more fungible servic-
es-tax subsidies-in a more competitive environment, distinguished by many
more possible purchasers and consequent collective action problems. While the
various buyers of tax subsidies may attempt to cartelize themselves, and may
often succeed, in general the more competitive tax process is less conducive
to such cartelization than the procedures which supply direct expenditure
programs. In the more pluralistic tax context, the effective demand and the
available supply of government largesse will be suppressed by the
countervailing pressures of offsetting interest groups since, as a matter of
demand, many heterogenous groups are less likely to form a working majority
while, as a matter of supply, the benefits furnished to one group come at the
expense of the others.
Admittedly, the ability of interest groups to overcome collective action
problems and thus cartelize themselves into a working majority is affected by
factors other than the diversity and number of those groups. Some legislators
and administrators are more skillful at supplying services to organized
clienteles than others; committees and agencies composed of talented political
entrepreneurs are more likely to witness the formation of effective coalitions
than are institutions populated by officials less adept at midwifing such
coalitions. To the extent that external forces successfully constrain the largesse
available to particular committees and bureaucracies, the environments within
those organizations partake of zero sum games, making cooperation among
interests more difficult as they are pitted directly against one another for a
portion of a fixed pie. If, on the other hand, such external constraints are
looser, organized interests are more likely to logroll themselves into an
effective alliance to obtain additional resources for the alliance as a whole.
Notwithstanding these considerations, ceteris paribus, tax committees and
agencies with more numerous and diverse constituencies are less likely to be
captured than direct expenditure institutions subject to fewer and more
homogeneous pressures.
Indeed, contra to the Surrey critique, tax institutions, because of their
greater political freedom, are better positioned than direct expenditure
organizations to design and implement policies informed by expertise. The
theoretical skill of direct spending organizations is of little practical
significance when the clienteles of such organizations effectively dominate
them and their decisions. In contrast, the counterbalancing pressures on tax
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writers and tax administrators leave them comparatively freer to make
decisions informed by expertise if they are so inclined.
In advancing this analysis, I seek neither to demonize direct expenditure
institutions nor to create a countermyth about the organizations that formulate
and administer tax subsidies. Some members of Congress' agriculture
committees are concerned, as a matter of ideology or interest, with consumer
or similar issues and thus sometimes oppose certain farm lobbies; within the
agricultural community, the internal divisions are sometimes bitter, leading to
fierce political competition; some Secretaries of Agriculture define their roles
more ideologically or view the secretaryship as their final job, freeing them to
pursue more independent courses; interest groups frequently overcome
collective action problems and influence tax-writing and tax administration;
members of the Ways and Means and Finance Committees often do the
bidding of organized constitutencies-the Code does indeed contain significant
farm subsidies.
On the other hand, my analysis is an antidote to the benign, expertise-
oriented argument of the Surrey school for the superiority of direct expenditure
institutions, and suggests that tax institutions are better than is popularly
thought or academically portrayed. Agricultural interests seem to do well in the
tax-writing committees; they probably do better in direct spending contexts.
Farm interests can view the Secretary of Agriculture as their natural ally; the
same cannot be said of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue.46
Moreover, the trade press reinforces the greater influence of specialized
clienteles in the nontax committees of Congress and in the direct expenditure
departments of the executive branch by facilitating such clienteles' monitoring
of the committees and departments that service them. In contrast, the incentives
confronting the general press make tax institutions more visible to more
diverse constituencies and to the public as a whole.47
A newspaper with a general readership is likely to allocate its reporting
efforts and space to the congressional committees and executive agencies
perceived as directly affecting the most potential readers: the tax panels, the
IRS, the Treasury. For the general press, there is less reward in covering
specialized institutions such as the agricultural committees and the Department
of Agriculture, which are of immediate concern to smaller audiences. For the
46. While I have illustrated my case with the example of agriculture, I could have used the
transportation industry, the natural resources lobbies, the real estate business, veterans groups or any of the
interests that seek and obtain largesse from the federal fise. Indeed, in my empirical research, I examine
several of these interests and their relationships to tax and direct expenditure institutitions. See Appendix
infra p.1 195. In each of these cases, the specialized nontax committees of Congress are more likely to be
captured by the relatively narrow interests affected by each committee's jurisdiction. Corresponding
administrative agencies are similarly susceptible to capture in the implementation of direct spending
programs benefiting relatively limited clienteles. However, in the processes of tax-writing and tax
administration, each of these interests is more likely to find itself contending with competing groups.
47. For an empirical analysis supporting my conclusions about the trade and general press, see the
discusson infra notes 129-142 and accompanying text.
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trade press, on the other hand, the incentives are the reverse. To attract and
retain a specialized readership, the trade press must demonstrate a comparative
advantage in reporting the news which is slighted by the general media but
which is of particular importance to the members of the trade. Hence, the trade
press will tend to follow more fully its specialized clientele institutions like the
farm committees and the Department of Agriculture, serving as a relatively
efficient means for specialized constitutencies, as principals, to oversee the
performance of nontax decisionmakers, as their agents.
In short, nontax institutions are, through the trade press, more effectively
monitored by the interest groups these institutions affect directly than by the
public at large, while the general public can do a comparatively better job of
overseeing the tax system through the general media.
Insofar as the expertise critique of tax incentives is a tactical argument
advanced by those seeking purity in the Code while avoiding the substantive
merits of particular tax subsidies, my argument is a tactical reply, suggesting
that the tax committees of Congress, the Treasury and the IRS, more
competitive, pluralist and visible environments, are procedurally superior to
direct spending institutions. To the extent the expertise critique of tax subsidies
is an efficiency argument for committing a given amount of spending to more
knowledgeable direct expenditure specialists, my analysis suggests the
generalists inhabiting tax institutions are actually better positioned to make
decisions informed by expertise because of the relative political freedom
engendered by the myriad countervailing constituencies of the tax system.
Approaching the expertise critique as a formula for reducing government
outlays via the more critical scrutiny of direct expenditure experts, my
argument again suggests the critique is wrong: the legislators and
administrators of direct expenditure organizations, susceptible to capture by the
comparatively narrow clientele groups within their respective jurisdictions, are
likely to supply greater, not lesser, spending to those groups. Finally, insofar
as the expertise critique of tax subsidies reflects the technocratic and
managerial values embedded in our political culture, my defense of tax
processes appeals to a tradition both older and newer which focuses not upon
the presumed proficiencies of decisionmakers, but upon the desirability of
maximizing participation in governmental processes.
My perspective, while influenced by the economic theory of regulation, is
different, in many respects, from the public choice analysis of The Tax Reform
Act of 1986 advanced by Professors Doernberg and McChesney.43 Chief
among their concerns is debunking the image of the 1986 Act as the triumph
48. Richard L. Doernberg & Fred S. McChesney, On the Accelerating Rate and Decreasing Durability
of Tax Reform, 71 MINN. L. REV. 913 (1987) [hereinafter Doemberg & McChesney, Accelerating Rate of
Tax Reform]; Richard L. Doernberg & Fred S. McChesney, Doing Good or Doing Well?: Congress and
The Tax Reform Act of 1986, 62 N.Y.U. L. REV. 891 (1987) [hereinafter Doernberg & McChesney, Doing
Good].
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of public good over special interests. Professors Doemberg and McChesney
find that, contrary to prevailing perception, Congress' tax-writers supplied to
a variety of industries both affirmative tax benefits and protection from
threatened tax disadvantages. This largesse was purchased from the members
and staffs of the Finance and Ways and Means Committees through campaign
contributions4 9 honoraria 0 and such "in-kind benefits" as free travel and
entertainment.," In the Doemberg-McChesney saga, Congress' tax-writers
were (and are) particularly entrepreneurial, sometimes creating the threat of tax
disadvantages in order subsequently to sell their protection.5 2
Doernberg and McChesney take direct aim at the "political fairy tale"53
of Gucci Gulch, the hallways outside the tax-writing committees densely
packed with high paid, well-dressed lobbyists. The conventional story is that
the denizens of Gucci Gulch lost in 1986, the general welfare prevailing over
special interests in the rewriting of the tax code.54 In the spirit of public
choice theory, Professors Doemberg and McChesney tell us the truth is
otherwise: "tax politics as usual, with considerable sums of money changing
hands," 5 -- tax benefits supplied and purchased.
As one who believes both that the economic theory of regulation contains
much truth and that the Tax Reform Act of 1986 represented a distinct
improvement to the Code, I find the Doemberg-McChesney perspective a
useful counterweight to the rosier stories advanced about the 1986 Act. On the
other hand, I think it is helpful to take another step and compare the tax-
writing processes of which Professors Doernberg and McChesney are so
critical with the institutions that formulate direct government outlays. And, in
such a comparison, the tax system displays distinct advantages in pluralist and
public choice terms.
Madison would have been neither surprised nor particularly alarmed by
Gucci Gulch and its residents: self-interest and "the spirit of faction" are
inevitable in human beings, and thus in politics. In the confines of Gucci
Gulch, the advocates of numerous and varied groups contended against one
49. Doemberg & McChesney, Accelerating Rate of Tax Reform, supra note 48, at 936.
50. Id. at 940.
51. Id. at 941-42.
52. Id. at 944.
53. Doemberg & McChesney, Doing Good, supra note 48, at 893.
54. The leading statement of this perspective is JEFFREY H. BIRNBAUM & ALAN S. MURRAY,
SHOWDOWN AT Gucci GULCH: LAWMAKERS, LOBBYISTS AND THE UNLIKELY TRIuMPH OF TAX REFORM
(1987); see also Jane Bryant Quinn, The Illusion of Tax Relief, NEWSWEEK, Feb. 10, 1992, at 25 ("The
good-government types of the 1980s produced a fairer tax code by wiping out subsidies paid to dozens of
special interests, and used the savings to fund lower tax rates."). A more balanced, but decidedly favorable,
view of the Tax Reform Act of 1986 is provided by C. Eugene Steuerle, an influential commentator on tax
policy issues and an important participant in the processes which culminated in the 1986 Act. See C.
EUGENE STEUERLE, THE TAX DECADE (1992). Steuerle's version of the story gives great credit to
bureaucratic, academic and public interest forces concerned with tax reform. It is literally a footnote to his
narrative that important industries and corporations benefited from the 1986 legislation and played
important roles in securing its passage. Id. at 119 n.5.
55. Doemberg & McChesney, Doing Good, supra note 48, at 893.
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another. If the process and results of that competition were not particularly
appetizing, they were preferable to their direct expenditure equivalents. Well-
paid lobbyists, representing special interests, monitor and influence the
deliberations of the nontax committees of Congress and are more likely to
dominate such discussions given the less competitive, less visible environments
of those specialized, limited constituency committees. From a Madisonian
vantage point, the crowded halls of Gucci Gulch look safer than the quieter
quarters of the Congress' agriculture committees.
56
Some hint of this is to be found in the Doernberg-McChesney analysis. In
that analysis, a key piece of evidence is the vast quantum of campaign
contributions received from diverse sources by the members of the Finance and
Ways and Means panels.57 Yet, the aggregate size of those donations and the
variety of sources suggest that Congress' tax-writers are not dependent upon
any particular set of contributors. For those concerned about interest group
capture, such a state of affairs is preferable to the alternative: legislators
heavily indebted for campaign funds to limited constituencies. The economic
theory of regulation suggests that the senators and representatives who serve
on nontax committees will find themselves in this unfortunate situation, highly
reliant for campaign funds upon the relatively homogeneous interest groups
serviced by the committees on which such legislators sit.
My analysis of the contrasting qualities of the tax and direct expenditure
processes suggests a number of areas for empirical research. Foremost among
these is a comparison of the largesse obtained by organized interests through
direct spending with the benefits secured by those same interests through the
Internal Revenue Code. If, as I suggest, it is harder for organized
constituencies to capture tax processes, we would expect that such
constituencies receive greater assistance from the more pliable direct
expenditure institutions. On the other hand, if the Code is the preferred
instrument of special interests, we would anticipate that such interests receive
a higher ratio of tax benefits to direct monetary outlays.
To make this comparison, I have calculated from the regular and tax
expenditure budgets for the fiscal years 1980 through 1991 the federal
government's direct and tax outlays in four selected areas: agriculture,
veterans, transportation and mineral resources. The detailed results are
presented in Table 1 in the Appendix. 58 From 1980 to 1991, direct federal
outlays for agriculture, veterans, mineral and transportation clienteles
substantially exceeded the tax expenditures in these same areas. In the most
recent year for which comparison can be made, fiscal 1991, for every dollar
56. While I make this observation with respect to the agriculture committees, the same may be said
about any other of the specialized, nontax committees of the House and Senate.
57. Doemberg & McChesney, Acclerating Rate of Tax Reform, supra note 48, at 936; Doemberg &
McChesney, Doing Good, supra note 48, at 900.
58. Jnfra p.1197.
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of tax breaks for mineral-related activity, $3.72 was expended directly on
mineral programs. In that same year, the ratio of direct veterans outlays to
veterans tax benefits was 15:1 while the ratios of direct to tax spending for
agriculture and transportation were 22:1 and 230:1, respectively.
I do not contend that the nature of the legislative and administrative
processes is the only variable determining the levels of tax and direct spending
in these particular categories. I do, however, conclude that the orders of
magnitude in Table I are revealing and, to an important degree, are determined
by the character of these processes. With all of the caveats and limitations
associated with Table 1, its data suggest that organized constituencies obtain
greater largesse through the more capturable direct expenditure processes than
through the more competitive tax institutions, which is the result predicted by
my analysis.
Turning to campaign contributions, I attempted to compare the relative
dependence on special interests of Congress' tax-writers with the members of
Congress' nontax committees; 59 my results are presented in Table 2 in the
Appendix."
Acknowledging that the data in Table 2 is merely suggestive, it
nevertheless strongly suggests that members of Congress' specialized, direct
expenditure committees are more heavily dependent for campaign donations
on the limited clienteles they serve than are the members of the tax committees
who receive donations from more varied and diverse sources. For 1989-90, the
average member of the Senate Agriculture Committee received in absolute
dollar amounts over seven times the campaign contributions from agricultural
PAC's ($93,640) as did the mean member of the Finance Committee
($12,222). Moreover, the agricultural donations received by members of the
farm committee represented over ten percent of their total PAC contributions
but only half that proportion (5.1%) for members of the Finance panel.
A similar picture emerges from an examination of the transportation
lobby's contributions. In absolute dollar amounts, the average member of the
House Public Works and Transporation Committee received in 1989-90 almost
fifty percent more from transportation PAC's ($39,440) than did the average
representative serving on Ways and Means ($27,066). Even more notable is the
proportionate dependence on transportation contributions of the typical member
of the House Transportation Committee. For the average member of that
specialized, direct expenditure body, almost twenty percent of PAC
contributions came from transportation sources. In contrast, the representatives
on Ways and Means received on average roughly ten percent of their PAC
money from donors connected to transportation industries.
59. Information was compiled from reports filed with the Federal Election Commission and retrieved
through Lexis.
60. Infra pp. 1200, 1201, 1202, 1204.
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One could reasonably characterize as substantial the donations from farm
and transportation PAC's to the Finance and Ways and Means Committees.
However, in the context of agriculture and transportation donations to the
direct expenditure committees, Congress' tax-writers are less dependent on
those interests than the legislators serving on the direct expenditure panels
affecting those industries. The data in Table 2 are consistent with the argument
that more specialized, limited constituency institutions (i.e., the agriculture and
transportation committees) are more capturable than generalist institutions with
more diverse and numerous clienteles (i.e., the tax committees).
Finally, I have tested the thesis that the general press covers more
extensively the tax-related institutions of the federal government while the
trade press is more oriented towards the narrowly focused entities of the direct
expenditure system. The results, embodied in Table 3 in the Appendix,6' with
one important exception, confirm that trade publications facilitate monitoring
of direct expenditure processes by specialized clienteles while the general
media provide tax institutions with broader visibility to the public as a whole.
Each of the three general papers I surveyed carried more articles about
Congress' two tax-writing committees than about the six selected direct
expenditure committees combined. In contrast, the trade publications generally
carried substantially more articles about the specialized committees affecting
the publication's particular trade audience than about the tax panels.
The notable exceptions to this pattern are the two journals of the oil
industry, Oil and Gas Journal and National Petroleum News, which gave more
coverage to Ways and Means and Finance than to the direct expenditure
committees with jurisdiction over oil. At one level, this result is not surprising;
it is a commonplace that oil interests have done well for themselves in the tax-
writing process. 62 Whatever the reasons for this phenomenon, the oil trade
press is the proverbial exception that proves the rule, monitoring Congress'
tax-writing panels more heavily than the direct expenditure committees with
jurisdiction over the petroleum industry and thus reflecting a different pattern
from the rest of the trade publications in my sample.
V. OBJECTIONS, QUALIFICATIONS AND REFINEMENTS
I now want to anticipate some objections to my analysis and, where
appropriate, qualify and refine my argument. First, it can be argued that, if the
generalists who write and administer the tax laws are not knowledgeable about
particular substantive areas of government, their lack of expertise engenders
a form of capture stemming from their consequent dependence on the
information provided by interest groups. Bureaucrats in direct expenditure
61. Infra p. 1206.
62. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 469(c)(3) (1992) (exempting certain oil entities from the passive loss rules).
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agencies and members of Congress on nontax committees can, the reasoning
goes, independently evaluate the data and proposals advanced by constituencies
within their respective jurisdictions because such legislators and bureaucrats
possess independent, countervailing expertise; tax personnel, in contrast, are
more dependent upon importuning constituencies because tax personnel cannot
assess the validity of what they are told. When, for example, the farm lobby
furnishes data and advice to the Secretary of Agriculture or to members of
Congress' agriculture committees, those individuals can evaluate that material
for themselves or can turn to professional staff which can evaluate it for them.
On the other hand, the argument runs, tax writers and administrators,
generalists lacking specialized expertise in agriculture, are effectively captured
by the farm lobby on whose information they depend.
By way of rejoinder, I should first make explicit my skepticism towards
the claim of expertise for direct expenditure institutions, a skepticism in which
I am not alone. Professor Wildavsky, for example, posits as a central
characteristic of Congress' budget process the failure of congressmen to master
the complex, technical details necessary for a thorough evaluation of the
programs they oversee.63 And once the premise of direct expenditure expertise
is rejected, the asserted problem of dependence upon clientele-provided
information must affect tax and nontax decisionmakers alike.
Accepting arguendo that participants in direct expenditure institutions
possess cognizable expertise in the particular areas within their respective
jurisdictions, tax writers and administrators can develop comparable
proficiencies in specialized topics, thereby abating their informational reliance
on interested lobbies. Members of the Ways and Means and Finance
Committees and Treasury and congressional staff can focus upon the tax
problems of particular industries, cultivating particularized expertise which
enables them to evaluate independently the claims asserted and the information
provided by such industries. A representative on a Ways and Means
subcommittee addressing farm tax subsidies is likely to develop expertise in
agricultural matters approaching that of his colleague on the farm committee.
The same is true of a Finance Committee staffer overseeing tax subsidies for
farming or of an IRS lawyer dealing extensively with the Code provisions
affecting agriculture.
Moreover, tax policymakers, because of the competing groups within their
jurisdiction, are less dependent than their direct expenditure counterparts on
information provided by any particular group, since rival lobbyists in the more
competitive tax environment have incentives to produce negative data to
discredit competing claims.
Finally, even if direct expenditure institutions possess superior expertise
in the abstract, such institutions, because of their greater proclivity towards
63. WVILDAVSKY, supra note 21, at 73-74.
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political capture, are less likely than tax organizations to make decisions
actually informed by such expertise. Paradoxically, tax decisionmakers, even
if theoretically less knowledgeable in particular substantive areas, are better
able to make decisions informed by the expertise they do possess because their
more competitive, visible environment frees them to use what expertise they
have.
These observations, in turn, suggest further qualification of my thesis: as
individuals and institutions in the tax process specialize to acquire proficiency
in particular areas of substantive policy, the tension between capture and
expertise reemerges. A Treasury lawyer who specializes in the tax problems
of agriculture acquires industry-specific skills and knowledge likely to affect
his views and future employment; a senator with a narrowly-focused concern
about the tax problems of agriculture will develop a relationship with the farm
lobby similar to that of a member of the Senate's agriculture panel. If too
much substantive policy is channeled through the tax committees and the
Treasury, these institutions will be forced to organize themselves internally by
subject matter and thus start to resemble their more capturable direct
expenditure counterparts. Confronted with overly-expansive responsibilities, the
tax-writing committees will of necessity divide themselves into myriad
specialized subcommittees which, because of their circumscribed jurisdictions
and constituencies, will be as vulnerable to capture as the equivalent direct
expenditure committees. Similarly, the Treasury, forced to cope with too many
diverse, substantive areas of government, will be required to organize itself
into a variety of capturable subtreasuries each with its own restricted scope and
clientele. In sum, the tax system does not have infinite capacity in the
generalist, multi-constituency form in which it exists today; if overutilized, the
tax system will be forced to specialize in a fashion which replicates the
expertise and capturability characteristics of direct expenditure institutions.
Another possible rejoinder to my analysis would suggest that the
competitive nature of the second and third stages of the process for adopting
direct government outlays compensates for capture in the first and fourth
stages, thereby redeeming the process as a whole from the effects of special
interests. The Surrey school could concede that, while the specialized
committees of Congress and the nontax departments of the executive branch
are highly vulnerable to capture by their respective constituencies, the problem
is corrected in the deliberations of the full houses of Congress and in the
President's participation in the process. In these two stages, groups which
dominate their respective committees and executive departments are forced to
contend with one another, ensuring the competition among interests prescribed
by the Madisonian/public choice/pluralist perspective, purging the taint of
capture from the system as a whole and introducing a visible, pluralist cast to
the direct expenditure system. In modified form, this argument conceives of
Congress' appropriations and budget panels as competitive environments which
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eliminate the effects of capture by overriding the decisions of the substantive
committees that act as the advocates for their respective constituencies.
While there is an element of truth to this line of thought, there is much
overstatement in it as well. Left to their own devices, the Department of
Agriculture and Congress' agriculture committees would probably devote most
of the federal budget to farm subsidies. The full Congress and the President
obviously will not let this happen.64 However, it overstates the corrective
influence of the President and Congress as a whole to conclude that they can
completely eradicate the consequences of capture in the direct expenditure
committees and executive departments. The consensus among scholars studying
Congress is that a particular clientele's domination of a committee leads to a
final outcome more favorable to that clientele.65 It is similarly a commonplace
among students of American government that an interest group's control of an
administrative agency affects the final outcome of the political process in ways
favorable to that group.
66
In terms of the stylized, four stage process, 67 the decisions of legislative
committees set agendas and furnish resources for the debates of the full bodies
in the second stage, thereby affecting the results of those second stage
deliberations. 68 If we view the floors of both houses as arenas dedicated to
logrolling, the interest that loses in committee has no log to roll. Conversely,
the interest doing well in committee has more logs to roll and, hence, is likely
to emerge at the end with a larger portion of the overall largesse being
dispensed. By the same token, the President's options are heavily
circumscribed by the actions of the federal bureaucracy, actions which
frequently constitute services supplied to clientele interests.
Ultimately, it is self-defeating for the Surrey school to claim that the
capture of the direct expenditure committees is irrelevant to final legislative
outcomes, for such a claim suggests that committees do not matter, a
supposition that undercuts the proceduralist indictment of tax subsidies based
64. Again, I am using the agriculture committees and department only as illustrations.
65. See, e.g., Elhauge, supra note 32, at 42; Eskridge Jr., supra note 30, at 293; William H. Riker &
Barry R. NVeingast, Constitutional Regulation of Legislative Choice: The Political Consequences of Judicial
Deference to Legislatures, 74 VA. L. REV. 373, 387 (1988) (arguing that "committee dominance over
choice in its policy jurisdiction is well-known" (citations omitted)); Kenneth A. Shepsle, Congress Is a
"They," Not an "It": Legislative Intent as Oxymoron, 12 INT'L REV. L. & EcON. 239, 245 (1992) (noting
strategic position of committees in legislatures); Kenneth A. Shepsle & Barry R. Weingast, The Institutional
Foundations of Committee Power, 81 AM. POL. Sl. REV. 85 (1987) (same). For an analysis emphasizing
the constraints placed by the full bodies of Congress on their committees, see Keith Krehbiel, Are
Congressional Committees Composed of Preference Outliers?, 84 Am. POL. Sc. REV. 149 (1990). For an
interesting interchange among these authors, see Keith Krehbiel et al., Why Are Congressional Committees
Powerfid?, 81 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 929 (1987).
66. An agency's success on behalf of its clientele is reciprocated by the clientele's support of the
agency. Hence, these two legs of the iron triangle reinforce each other. See supra note 43.
67. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
68. Indeed, among the most important accomplishments of public choice theorists is the rigorous
confirmation of the intuitions that procedure can determine outcome and that the power to set agendas is
the power to influence final results. See MUELLER, supra note 28, at 38, 44, 57.
118719931
The Yale Law Journal
on the importance of committee expertise. A critical premise of this indictment
is that nontax committees do matter, that they beneficially mold ultimate
legislative outcomes in accordance with their specialized knowledge. If,
however, the full bodies of Congress nullify the influence of direct expenditure
committees as agents for their respective clienteles, the full bodies must also
eradicate the influence of those committees as expert institutions. There is,
thus, no reason to prize nontax committees' expertise since, under these
assumptions, it does not shape final legislative results.
It is similarly self-defeating for proponents of expertise in governmental
decisionmaking to take refuge from problems of executive agency capture in
the shadow of the President, the ultimate generalist in our system of
government. It is a strange image of presidential leadership that presents the
President as negating the executive bureaucracy's tendency to promote clientele
interests, but as simultaneously constrained by the bureaucracy's capacity as
a repository of specialized knowledge. More convincingly, a President who
overrides agency advocacy can also override agency expertise.
For the same reasons, it is also unpersuasive for defenders of Professor
Surrey's position to advance the appropriations and budget committees as the
pluralist, competitive bodies that redeem the direct expenditure system from
problems of capture; the appropriations and budget panels are composed of the
same generalists who, as tax writers, are criticized as inexpert. Furthermore,
the appropriations committees exercise authority over a limited and decreasing
share of the federal government's outlays. Entitlement spending and off-budget
activity, particularly the extension of federal credit, represent large and rapidly
growing sectors of the national budget, outside the jurisdiction of the
appropriations committees and consequently beyond any discipline those
committees might impose.6 9
The role of Congress' budget committees is similarly quite restricted, both
in theory and in practice. In theory, the budget panels merely impose overall
spending limits in general areas, leaving the significant task of allocating funds
within those limits to other, capturable committees. In practice, the budget
committees have not even exercised effectively their theoretical authority to
impose overall spending restraints. ° Moreover, the appropriations committees
work through numerous specialized subcommittees, each capturable because
of its relatively limited and homogeneous constitutencies. Professor Wildavsky
has noted the evolution of the appropriations panels from bodies exercising
"guardianship" in constraining federal outlays to advocacy institutions
promoting clientele interests in the budget process, a change he attributes to
69. WILDAVSKY, supra note 21, at 9, 12, 18, 28, 121, 268; Kate Stith, Rewriting the Fiscal
Constitution: The Case of Gramm-Rudman-Hollings, 76 CAL. L. REV. 595, 605-09 (1988).
70. WILDAVSKY, supra note 21, at 142-59. Professor Wildavsky, our leading commentator on the
federal budget process, has described the "helplessness" of Congress' budget committees, concluding that
these committees are "ineffective guardians" of the federal fisc. Id. at 216.
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broad transformations in American and congressional politics. 7' My analysis
suggests an additional cause for the appropriations panels' metamorphosis from
guardians of the fisc to promoters of spending: a specialized appropriations
subcommittee with authority over narrow and homogeneous interests is as
susceptible to capture as the corresponding substantive committee of Congress.
In sum, those asserting the alleged expertise of direct expenditure organiza-
tions face a dilemma when they argue that other institutions-the President, the
full houses of Congress, the appropriations and budget committees-eradicate
special interest influence. If that argument is correct, we would expect
Congress and the President to override the effects of committee and
departmental expertise as well. If that argument is wrong, we are left with
direct expenditure institutions, more susceptible to capture, shaping final
legislative and administrative outcomes for the benefit of their respective
clienteles.
Finally, let me anticipate an alternative interpretation of Table 1 which
would attribute the greater largesse channeled through direct monetary outlays
to technical limitations on tax subsidies rather than to the more capturable
nature of direct expenditure institutions. There are inherent constraints, the
argument goes, in the amount of financial assistance that can be steered
through the Internal Revenue Code. Hence, high ratios of direct to tax
subsidies indicate not greater political competition in tax institutions, but
technical limitations in the quantum of spending which can occur through the
Code.
Tax expenditure analysis correctly suggests, to the contrary, that no such
limitation exists, that any direct outlay can, as a technical matter, be
transformed into an equivalent tax subsidy.72 For example, Congress could,
if it wanted, replace veterans' monthly benefit checks with refundable tax
credits for veterans similar to the earned income credit for low income
taxpayers.73 Likewise, direct cash subsidies to farmers could be converted into
tax deductions which, if not immediately needed, could be sold to other
taxpayers in the style of safe-harbor leasing.74 Professor Bittker has noted the
interchangeability of the various features of a tax system. Writing in particular
about the property tax exemption for religious institutions, but with
implications beyond that specific topic, he observed: "As any first year law
student knows, there is more than one way to skin a cat: deductions, credits,
71. Id. at 19, 184.
72. SURREY & MCDANIEL, supra note 15, at 3.
73. See I.R.C. § 32 (1992). Indeed, the Code already provides employers with credits for hiring certain
Vietnam-era veterans. I.R.C. § 51(d)(1)(C) (1992).
74. Safe-harbor leasing, a short-lived experiment, was introduced by the Economic Recovery Tax Act
of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34 § 201, 95 Stat. 172, 214 in I.R.C. § 168(f)(8), but was then repealed by the
Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514 § 201, 100 Stat. 2085, 2121. For a discussion of the life and
death of safe-harbor leasing, see MICHAEL J. GRAETZ, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 406-07, 653-55 (1988).
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rate schedules, etc. can be easily manipulated to take the place of a dead
exemption"S7-- or the place of any direct monetary outlay.
I do not contend that the dominance of direct over tax outlays, as revealed
in Table 1, is solely attributable to the greater responsiveness of direct
expenditure institutions to their more homogeneous and less numerous
clienteles. Such responsiveness is, however, an important part of the story;
given the possibilities of designing programs as either tax or direct monetary
subsidies, the dominance of direct expenditures is not caused by technical
limitations to the tax system but rather reflects, in large measure, the more
capturable nature of the institutions of the direct expenditure system.
VI. IMPLICATIONS
What, then, are the implications of my analysis? First, and perhaps most
important, are its rhetorical ramifications. Embedded in the tax expenditure
literature is an invariable preference, procedural as well as substantive, for
direct government outlays. Similarly embedded in popular and academic
discourse is a pronounced disillusion with the federal tax system. My analysis
suggests a more balanced view of the processes for enacting and administering
tax subsidies.
Both the benign explanation for the Tax Reform Act of 198676 and the
less charitable account of that legislation77 share the premise of an essentially
degenerate political process, largely controlled by self-seeking interest groups
serviced by willing political entrepreneurs. The two accounts differ only as to
whether the tax system in 1986 experienced a brief, shining moment in which
the forces of light prevailed or whether the 1986 Act represented business as
usual in disguised form.
My portrayal of the tax system is more complex, positively and
normatively, than either of these two perspectives. The organizations that
design and implement federal taxes are not ideal or populated by the pure of
heart. However, Madison, like his near contemporary Adam Smith, reminds us
that perfection is not the criterion against which human institutions ought to
be measured and that the utility of such institutions does not depend upon the
motives or moral worthiness of those who populate them.
My argument further suggests that tax subsidies ought to be preferred to
direct expenditures when there is a need for detached administration and
oversight by decisionmakers less susceptible to capture. Because of his
competing constituencies and functions, the Secretary of the Treasury is more
likely to implement an agricultural program independently of farm lobbyists
75. Boris 1. Bittker, Churches, Taxes and the Constitution, 78 YALE L.J. 1285, 1287 n.ll (1969).
76. See BIRNBAUM & MURRAY, supra note 54; STEUERLE, supra note 54.
77. See Doernberg & McChesney, Accelerating Rate of Tax Reform, supra note 48; Doemberg &
McChesney, Doing Good, supra note 48.
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than the Secretary of Agriculture; the Treasury is also more apt than the
Department of Agriculture to disapprove a farm subsidy it administers and
propose the subsidy's abolition. An important instance of such detached
evaluation is the Treasury's 1984 tax reform study which recommended
abolishing a variety of federal tax subsidies for, inter alia, transportation,
military and mineral interests. 8 It is hard to conceive of the direct
expenditure departments proposing such sweeping repeal of the programs they
administer. Similarly, the Ways and Means and Finance panels, because of
their greater visibility and offsetting clientele pressures, are better positioned
than the direct expenditure committees to oversee subsidy programs
objectively.
As noted earlier, the tax system is a limited resource which, if
overutilized, will start to resemble the direct expenditure institutions. 79
Nevertheless, within the constraints of the system's capacity, policymakers
seeking more disinterested administration and evaluation ought to follow the
tax subsidy route.
My analysis also raises a cautionary note about the joint formulation and
implementation of tax preferences by tax and direct expenditure institutions,."
Professors Surrey and McDaniel question the feasibility of the collaborative
design and administration of tax subsidies.81 I, on the other hand, now see
political risks to such cooperation as it potentially introduces into the tax
process the enhanced influence of the affected clientele groups through their
heightened leverage in the specialized committees of Congress and the nontax
agencies of the executive branch. In light of these risks, it would be desirable
to experiment with arrangements designed to utilize in the tax-writing process
the expertise of direct expenditure institutions without importing such
institutions' greater susceptibility to capture. For example, it would be useful
to experiment with the composition of the Ways and Means and Finance
Committees, with each substantive committee of Congress designating one
member to sit simultaneously on his chamber's tax panel, serving as a conduit
to the tax-writing process for the expertise of his substantive committee. When
coupled with limitations on dual committee participation (e.g., no more than
two senators serving simultaneously on the agriculture and finance panels),
such a liaison arrangement could systematically introduce into the tax
committees whatever subject matter expertise resides in the nontax panels
while protecting against those panels' greater vulnerability to capture. In the
78. U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, 2 TAX REFORM FOR FAIRNESS, SIMPLICITY, AND ECONOMIC
GROWTH 47,223,324 (1984) (proposing abolition of military-related exclusions from gross income, repeal
of variety of tax preferences relative to energy and natural resources, and abolition of tax benefits for
merchant marine capital construction fund).
79. See supra p.1186.
80. See the discussion hifta text accompanying notes 16-18.
81. See SURREY & MCDANIEL, supra note 15, at 106-07.
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absence of experience with such arrangements, there is no a priori reason to
prefer the direct expenditure system, the tax subsidy system, or cooperation
between the two.
While my analysis is most relevant to the choices confronting tax and
budgetary policymakers, it is also potentially useful to the courts. Consider, in
this respect, the traditional judicial deference to administrative agencies on the
grounds of agency expertise. That deference has been challenged in recent
years by legal scholars portraying administrative institutions as captured by
their respective clienteles and consequently unworthy of such consideration.82
If courts are prepared to categorize agencies into the expert and the captured,
deferring to the former but not the latter, my analysis suggests that tax
administrators belong in the expert classification because their numerous and
variegated constituencies bestow upon them the political freedom to make
decisions informed by expertise. The IRS and the Treasury are not immune
from political pressures or interest group influence; they are, however, better
positioned to resist such forces than bureaucrats dependent on limited and
homogeneous clienteles.
My analysis also buttresses the distinction in the Supreme Court's
Establishment Clause jurisprudence between tax and direct subsidies. An
important theme of that jurisprudence is that tax provisions benefiting religious
entities stand on firmer constitutional grounds than monetary outlays to such
entities. While this case law has been criticized by some commentators, my
argument suggests that, in light of the greater susceptibility to capture of direct
expenditure institutions, the Court's First Amendment distinction between tax
subsidies and direct appropriations is sound from a proceduralist perspective.
The distinction between tax and direct expenditures was initially advanced
as a constitutional matter in Walz v. Tax Commission of New York,' 3 in which
the Supreme Court upheld, over Establishment Clause objections, the constitu-
tionality of New York's property tax exemption for churches, synagogues, and
similar religious enterprises. In reaching its decision, the Walz Court drew a
line between "direct allocation of public revenue" to religious associations and
"indirect economic benefit" bestowed upon religious organizations via the tax
system."4
82. The article that began discussion of these issues among legal scholars was Jerry L. Mashaw,
Constitutional Deregulation: Notes Toward a Public, Public Law, 54 TUL. L. REV. 849 (1980). Among
other important contributions to this literature is Jonathan R. Macy, Promoting Public-Regarding Legislation
Through Statutory Interpretation: An Interest Group Model, 86 COLuM. L. REV. 223, 263 (1986) ("[Tjhe
commonly held view that prior interpretations of statutes by administrative agencies should be afforded
great deference should be reconsidered."). An excellent summary of this discussion is presented in Linda
R. Hirshman, Trends in the Law: Postmodern Jurisprudence and the Problem of Administrative Discretion,
82 Nw. U. L. REV. 646 (1988). For a discussion of these issues from the perspective of a political scientist,
see MOE, supra note 35.
83. 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
84. Id. at 674-675 & n.3. See also the concurring opinions of Justice Brennan, id. at 690 ("Tax
exemptions and general subsidies.., are qualitatively different. Though both provide economic assistance,
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The same distinction was later invoked in Mueller v. Allen, upholding
a Minnesota income tax deduction for parental tuition, textbook, and
transportation outlays. While the deduction was available to taxpayers with
children attending both public and private schools, most of the deductions were
taken by parents with offspring in parochial schools. In sustaining the
Minnesota deduction against First Amendment challenge, the Mueller Court
reiterated that tax provisions stand on stronger constitutional ground than "the
direct transmission of assistance" from the public treasury to a religious
enterprise. 6
The Court's First Amendment distinction between tax and direct subsidies
has been attacked by many commentators. Professors Surrey and McDaniel,
for example, label Walz "naive[]" and "inadequate," an opinion that "will not
withstand economic analysis. '87 In this same vein, they lambast Mueller as
employing "a false distinction ''8s between tax and direct subsidies. Professor
Lashbrooke similarly bemoans that "[t]he majority in Walz completely
misunderstood or deliberately misconstrued the tax expenditure concept when
it drew a distinction between a direct money subsidy and a tax exemption.
''89
Such criticisms logically flow from the presumed equivalence of tax and direct
expenditures.
In contrast, my analysis suggests that, for First Amendment purposes, the
dichotomy between tax and direct subsidies to religious organizations is more
compelling procedurally than these commentators believe, given the similarity
between Establishment Clause concerns and notions of capture. While it is
troubling that the Department of Agriculture is influenced by farm interests,90
the de facto control of government agencies by religious institutions is
they do so in fundamentally different ways.") (citation omitted), and Justice Harlan, id. at 699 (noting
differences between "direct aid" and tax exemptions).
85. 463 U.S. 388 (1983).
86. Id. at 399. The Court's First Amendment distinction between tax and direct expenditures was also
central to Comm. for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973). In Nyquist, the
Court invalidated on constitutional grounds a New York statute extending to parochial school parents
assistance styled as tax benefits. These tax benefits were unrelated to parents' actual tuition outlays and
were coordinated with an associated program of direct cash grants to low-income families sending children
to private schools. Id. at 790. The Court viewed the tax program and the cash grant program as related and
declared both unconstitutional. It was critical to the Nyquist Court that New York's purported tax program
was not a "genuine" tax benefit based on actual tuition outlays but an "arbitrary" use of the tax system,
and ultimately, an extension of the direct grant program held unconstitutional. Id. at 790 n.49, 791.
87. SURREY & MCDANIEL, supra note 15, at 132-33.
88. Id. at 136.
89. Lashbrooke, supra note 15, at 717; see also Joseph M. Kuznicki, Comment, Section 170, Tax
Expenditures, and the First Amendment: The Failure of Charitable Religious Contributions for the Return
of a Religious Benefit, 61 TEMPLE L. REv. 443, 481 (1988) ("The Court's continued refusal to view tax
expenditures in the same light as direct government subsidies is not only irrational, but also perpetuates
government entanglement in the sphere of private religious beliefs.") (citation omitted).
90. Again, I emphasize that I use the example of agriculture as illustrative, not exclusive.
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considered especially harmful, so dangerous that it is proscribed
constitutionally via the Establishment Clause.9'
My argument indicates there is less danger of religious interests' capturing
tax institutions than direct expenditure agencies. The deduction at issue in
Mueller was administered by the Minnesota tax authorities as a part of the
state's general tax system. In the legislature's tax-writing committees,
supporters of the deduction had to contend with the proponents of other
competing tax breaks. Insofar as the politics of Minnesota mirror the politics
of the federal government, the Mueller deduction emerged from a more
pluralist, more visible, less capturable tax process than would have an
equivalent direct expenditure program. Hence, in proceduralist terms, the
deduction poses less threat to Establishment Clause values than a comparable
direct outlay.
VII. CONCLUSION
An important contention of the tax expenditure literature is that the
specialized institutions that design and administer direct government outlays
possess more expertise than the generalist organizations of the tax system. Just
as the substantive case against tax subsidies is premised on an idealized notion
of direct spending, the procedural indictment of tax preferences is built on an
idealized conception of the limited constituency institutions that formulate and
implement direct monetary appropriations, a conception that ignores the greater
susceptibility to capture of the direct expenditure committees of Congress and
the nontax departments of the executive branch.
Because of the more numerous and diverse interests to which they are
subject and their greater visibility to the public, the committees and agencies
that design and administer tax subsidies are less prone to capture by clientele
groups, conform more closely to pluralist norms, and are better positioned to
make decisions informed by expertise than their direct expenditure
counterparts. The values of the Madisonian/public choice/pluralist tradition of
interest group politics will thus lead, in particular cases, to a preference for the
more competitive tax organizations.
It is an unexciting defense of political institutions that they are better than
is commonly believed and probably the best that can be expected under
prevailing circumstances. Madison could not have anticipated the emergence
of the federal income tax and its associated organizations as dominant features
91. Of course, this is not the only possible understanding of the Establishment Clause. The separation
of church and state may also be understood as strengthening religion by preempting its cooptation by
government See, e.g., GARRY WILLS, UNDER GOD: RELIGION AND AMERICAN POLITICS 373 (1990). First
Amendment concerns can also be defined in exclusively substantive terms, eschewing procedural
considerations altogether.
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of American life; he would, however, have understood such a defense of
federal tax institutions.
VIII. APPENDIX: EMPIRICAL RESULTS
This Appendix presents the details of the calculations described in the text
of the Article. Table I presents data comparing levels of tax and direct
expenditures provided to four major clientele groups. Many qualifications
accompany these calculations. For example, in Table 1, I accept the Treasury's
identification of and accounting for particular items of tax preference. To take
one case, the tax expenditure budget lists accelerated depreciation 92 in
aggregates and does not allocate such depreciation among farmers,
transportation firms or natural resources corporations. Hence, in Table 1 I do
not include any amount of accelerated depreciation in the tax benefits accruing
to agricultural, transportation or mineral-related taxpayers.93 Moreover, the
categories used in the federal direct outlay budget do not always correspond
to the categories in the tax expenditure budget; in addition, some categories in
these documents have changed over time. Thus, I have had to exercise
judgment in consolidating particular items to create my four groupings,
judgments about which there can be reasonable disagreements. Indeed, the
groupings I have used (agriculture, transportation, veterans, and minerals) are
neither exhaustive of the special interests served by the direct outlay and tax
expenditure systems nor beyond challenge. I could, for example, have
disaggregated mineral interests into specific industries, e.g., oil, gas, and
uranium.
Proponents of certain direct expenditures would object to my
characterization of such outlays as special interest largesse, contending that
broader policy considerations justify such expenditures. This also holds true for
many of the tax preferences reflected in Table 1: proponents of these
preferences could plausibly defend them as advancing the public welfare rather
than clientele interests.
In compiling Table 1, I made numerous decisions in a fashion biased
against my thesis, i.e., increasing the estimate of tax expenditures while
discounting the level of direct outlays. For example, for technical reasons, tax
92. Professor Kahn suggests that accelerated depreciation is not properly considered a tax expenditure.
See Kahn, supra note 6, at 12. Since I am skeptical of many of the Treasury's characterizations of
particular items as tax subsidies, I am sympathetic to Professor Kahn's position. However, my methodology
in developing Table 1 has been to accept the Treasury's characterizations of specific provisions of the Code
as tax expenditures.
93. As I discuss infra p. 1196, the consistent dominance of direct expenditures over tax subsidies
suggests that the assumptions I made in compiling Table I did not affect the overall results. For example,
as to accelerated depreciation, the tax subsidy for all machinery and equipment in the economy amounted
to over twenty-eight billion dollars for 1991. Even if half of this total is arbitrarlly allocated to agriculture,
tax expenditures for farmers would still only (roughly) equal their direct monetary subsidies.
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expenditure budgets frequently present alternative estimations. In all such
cases, I have selected in Table 1 the highest appraisal of the level of tax
benefits. Similarly, I have not included the food stamp program within
agricultural outlays although some would classify food stamps in significant
part as spending to support demand for farm products. 94 Likewise, I have
omitted the large and growing off-budget activities of the federal government,
an omission which biases the figures against my thesis by reducing the
estimated largesse provided through direct monetary spending.95
With all of these qualifications, the dominance of direct over tax
expenditures was consistent for all four categories throughout the eleven-year
period covered by Table 1. This pattern was not appreciably affected by such
events as the Tax Reform Act of 1986 or the advent and departure of the
Reagan Administration. Given the strength and consistency of that dominance,
it is unlikely that the choices made in compiling Table 1 affected the overall
result, i.e., that largesse for these four interests comes predominantly through
direct expenditures obtainable via more capturable institutions rather than
through tax benefits which must be secured through more competitive, more
visible processes.
94. On the legislative history of the food stamp program, see John Ferejohn, Logrolling in an
Institutional Context: A Case Study of Food Stamp Legislation, in CONGRESS AND POLICY CHANGE 223
(Gerald C. Wright, Jr. et al. eds., 1986). Ferejohn portrays the congressional coalition for food stamps as
an alliance of urban Democrats interested in expanded welfare programs and rural congressmen seeking
commodity supports.
95. Penner, supra note 43, at 437 (noting the growth of off-budget activity including "credit programs"
that "rel[y] heavily on the creation of government sponsored enterprises outside of the budget"); see also
WILDAVSKY, supra note 21, at 9, 12, 28, 121, 268; Stith, supra note 69, at 605-09.
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96. The figures were compiled from the Office of Management and Budget's (OMB's), SPECIAL
ANALYSES, BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT [hereinafter OMB SPECIAL ANALYSES], and
its BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES [hereinafter OMB BUDGET], both of which are published annually.
Actual outlays for any given fiscal year [FY] are not available until the second following fiscal year.
97. See OMB SPECIAL ANALYSES, FY 1982, at 32-41 (Special Analysis A).
98. See OMB SPECIAL ANALYSES, FY 1980, at 207-I1 (Special Analysis G).
99. See OMB BUDGET, FY 1983, at 9-30 to 9-42 (Summary Tables).
100. See OMB SPECIAL ANALYSES, FY 1983, at 210-15 (Special Analysis G).
101. See OMB SPECIAL ANALYSES, FY 1984, at A-31 to A-41 (Special Analysis A).
102. See OMB SPECIAL ANALYSES, FY 1984, at G-26 to G-28, G-31 to G-33 (Special Analysis G).
103. See OMB SPECIAL ANALYSES, FY 1985, at A-29 to A-38 (Special Analysis A).
104. See OMB SPECIAL ANALYSES, FY 1985, at G-37 to G-42, G-43 to G-48 (Special Analysis G).
105. See OMB SPECIAL ANALYSES, FY 1986, at A-32 to A-43 (Special Analysis A).
106. See OMB SPECIAL ANALYSES, FY 1986, at G-38 to G-42, G-43 to G-47 (Special Analysis G).
107. See OMB SPECIAL ANALYSES, FY 1987, at A-33 to A-44 (Special Analysis A).
108. See OMB SPECIAL ANALYSES, FY 1987, at G-37 to G-41, G-42 to G-46 (Special Analysis G).
Year Veterans Agriculture Transportation Minerals
1980 Direct97  $21,183 $4,762 $25,857 $15,782
Tax9" $1,465 $1,305 $35 $6,720
1981 Direct9 9  $22,988 $5,572 $28,676 $18,515
Tax'00 $1,735 $1,495 $35 $8,555
1982 Direct 0' $23,955 $14,875 $26,277 $12,607
Tax' 02  $2,530 $1,410 $25 $10,885
1983 Direct0 3  $24,846 $22,206 $25,196 $12,052
Tax'O4  $2,690 $1,295 $200 $9,073
1984 Direct'o' $25,614 $13,613 $27,385 $13,758
Tax 06  $2,210 $1,975 $195 $7,193
1985 Direct0 7  $26,352 $25,565 $29,749 $13,344
Tax'03  $2,250 $1,245 $223 $6,873
(continued on following page)
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TABLE 1. Direct and Tax Expenditures (continued)
(in millions)
109. See OMB SPECIAL ANALYSES, FY 1988, at A-32 to A-43 (Special Analysis A).
110. See OMB SPECIAL ANALYSES, FY 1988, at G-37 to G-41, G-42 to G-46 (Special Analysis G).
Ill. See OMB SPECIAL ANALYSES, FY 1989, at A-31 to A-42 (Special Analysis A).
112. See OMB SPECIAL ANALYSES, FY 1989, at 0-36 to G-40, G-41 to G-45 (Special Analysis G).
113. See OMB SPECIAL ANALYSES, FY 1990, at A-31 to A-43 (Special Analysis A).
114. See OMB SPECIAL ANALYSES, FY 1990, at G-40 to G-44 (Special Analysis G).
115. See OMB SPECIAL ANALYSES, FY 1990, at A-31 to A-43 (Special Analysis A).
116. See OMB SPECIAL ANALYSES, FY 1990, at G-40 to G-44 (Special Analysis G).
117. See OMB SPECIAL ANALYSES, FY 1990, at A-3 Ito A-43 (Special Analysis A).
118. See OMB SPECIAL ANALYSES, F'Y 1990, at G40 to G-44 (Special Analysis G).
119. See OMB BUDGET, FY 1993, at Appendix One-6 to Appendix One-15.
120. See OMB, BUDGET, FY 1993, at Part Two-25 to Part Two-28. 
o
Year Veterans Agriculture Transportation Minerals
1986 Direct'" $26,356 $31,449 $31,872 $13,761
Tax" o  $2,295 $1,330 $185 $4,940
1987 Direct"' $26,782 $27,356 $30,191 $12,741
Tax" 2  $2,210 $680 $150 $4,665
1988 Direct" 3  $28,674 $22,352 $31,126 $13,615
Tax 14  $1,980 $858 $165 $3,830
1989 Direct" 5  $30,066 $16,948 $32,555 $15,901
Tax 16  $1,945 $790 $160 $4,178
1990 Direct" 7  $28,888 $14,571 $33,524 $16,703
Tax"8  $1,915 $560 $165 $4,500
1991 Direct" 9  $30,349 $15,183 $31,099 $16,446
Tax'I2 $1,990 $685 $135 $4,418
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Table 2A measures the Senate Finance Committee's 1989-90 election cyclepolitical action committee (PAC) contributions from agricultural sources; Table2B reflects contributions to the Senate Agriculture Committee from agriculturalPAC's during that same period. Table 2C measures contributions fromtransportation-related PAC's to members of the House Public Works andTransportation Committee during 1989-90 while Table 2D reports campaigncontributions from transportation PAC's to representatives serving on theHouse Ways and Means panel during the same period.' 21
The compilation of campaign contribution data in Table 2122 alsoinvolved numerous choices. First, I did not include any member serving onboth the tax committee and the nontax committee with which it is compared(e.g., a senator on both the Finance and Agriculture Committees) since dataabout such dual committee members is irrelevant to the thesis that membersof nontax committees depend more on particular interests for campaigncontributions than do legislators serving on tax-writing committees. Thereis, moreover, nothing immutable about the sample I selected or the particularyears I examined, i.e., agricultural and transportation contributions for 1989-90.Testing for other years and other interest groups might generate a differentpattern of PAC contributions than that embodied in Table 2. 2
121. Professor Snyder has noted the need for committee-specific inquiry into congressional campaigncontributions. James M. Snyder, Jr., Long-Term Investing in Politicians; Or, Give Early, Give Often, 35J.L. & ECON. 15, 39 (1992) (Future research could reveal that some "PACs might be tied to particularcongressional committees."). The data in Table 2 confirm the potential value of such committee-specificresearch.
122. All data in Tables 2A through Table 2D were compiled from Lexis, LEGIS library, CNGFIN file,Member/Candidate Financial Reports for each Senator or Representative.123. I have classified PAC's as agricultural or transportation based upon their names. Such judgmentswere made consistently: if a PAC was classified as agricultural when it contributed to a member of theSenate Agriculture Committee, it was so characterized when it donated to a member of the FinanceCommittee.
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TABLE 2A. Senate Finance Committee (1989-90)'
s
PAC Contributions



































Average PAC Contribution: 
$238,895 per Senator
Average Agricultural PAC Contribution: 
$12,222 per Senator
Contributions from Agricultural PAC's: 5.1%
125. Excluding members of Senate Agriculture Committee.
126. A negative number means that a campaign 
contribution was returned to the donor.
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TABLE 2B. Senate Agriculture Committee (1989-90)'27
PAC Contributions














Average Agricultural PAC Contribution:




127. Excluding members of Senate Finance Committee.
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TABLE 2C. House Public Works & Transportation Committee (1989-90)
PAC Contributions






































128. Eleanor Holmes Norton, the District of Columbia delegate, has no vote and was therefore omitted
from the survey.
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Table 2C. House Public Works & Transportation Committee (1989-90)
(continued)
PAC Contributions


































































Average Transportation PAC Contribution:
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TABLE 2D. House Ways & Means Committee (1989-90)
PAC Contributions













































































Average Transportation PAC contribution:
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Finally, using Nexis files, 129 I have estimated 30 in Table 3A, for a
sample of farm, petroleum, and transportation trade publications, the number
of stories appearing in each publication about one or both of the congressional
tax committees. I have also determined for each publication the approximate
number of articles about the appropriate direct expenditure committees of
Congress for the industry covered by that publication.' 31 In Table 3B, I have
similarly estimated for three large newspapers of general circulation
32 both
the number of articles about Congress' tax committees and the number of
stories about the six nontax committees affecting the farm, mineral and
transportation industries. 33 The final column of Table 3B reflects, for each
general newspaper, the ratio of its total articles about all six direct expenditure
committees to its articles about the two tax panels.
129. My research was done on April 18, 1992 and April 19, 1992 and thus reflects the Nexis files as
they existed on those two dates. My specific search terms were as follows: (senate w/5 committee and
senate w/5 commerce) or (house w/5 committee and house w/5 transport); (ways v/1 means) or (finance
%v/1 committee); (senate w/5 committee and senate w/5 commerce) or (house public works); (energy w/2
natural resources) or (energy w/3 committee and commerce w/l committee); agricultur! committee.
130. As to the publications with relatively small samples (Dairy Foods, Coal, Coal Week, National
Petroleum News and Transportation and Distribution), I read each article identified by my search to
confirm that it referred either to the tax committees of Congress or to the appropriate nontax committees
for the industry covered by the publication. As to the other publications surveyed (Oil and Gas Journal
and Aviation Daily), the electronic search produced too many items for me to read each individually.
Consequently, I read the first fifty articles revealed by each search to determine the percentage of false
positives, e.g., references to a state senate finance committee rather than the U.S. Senate Finance
Committee. I then applied the resulting ratio to the total number of items produced by the search. For
example, the search for "Ways and Means" and "Finance Committee" produced 429 total items in Oil and
Gas Journal. Of the first fifty of these, three were not reporting about the federal Senate or House tax-
writing committee while the other forty-seven were referring to one or the other (or both) of these panels.
Consequently, I have estimated the total references to the federal tax committees for Oil and Gas Journal
to be 404, i.e., 429 x 47/50.
131. Thus, for Dairy Foods, the nontax committees I measured were the Senate and House agriculture
committees. For Coal, Coal Week, National Petroleum News, and Oil and Gas Journal, I identified as the
appropriate direct expenditure panels the Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources and the
House Committee on Energy and Commerce. For Aviation Daily and Transportation and Distribution, I
used as the direct expenditure committees affecting the aviation and trucking industries the Senate
Committee on Commerce, Science and Technology and the House Committee on Public Works and
Transportation.
132. The New York Times, The Los Angeles Times and The Chicago Tribune.
133. See supra note 131.
19931 1205
The Yale Law Journal
TABLE 3A. Trade Press
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TABLE 3B. General Press34
Articles On N.Y. Times LA. Times Chicago Tribune
Agriculture Comm.'35  821 268 547
Minerals Comm.116 1,536 557 258
Transportation Comm."' 924 143 221
All Nontax Comm.' 38  3,281 968 1,026
All Tax Comm. 39  5,801 1,356 1,312
Ratio (Nontax:Tax) 40  1:1.77 1:1.40 1:1.28
Some limitations about this data must be acknowledged. My results may
be affected by the particular sample of ten publications (three general, seven
trade) which I have constructed and reported in Table 3. Several of the
magazines in my sample have come into the Nexis system relatively recently
and therefore have comparatively few observations.14 ' The publications
covered by Nexis may be unrepresentative of the publications omitted by
Nexis. Moreover, the information in Table 3 is purely quantitative, measuring
134. Because of the large number of items identified by my search, all of the estimates in Table 3B
were developed using the ratio method discussed supra note 130.
135. That is, total references to the House and Senate agriculture committees.
136. That is, the Senate Energy and Natural Resources Committee and the House Energy and
Commerce Committee.
137. That is, the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation and the House Public
Works and Transportation Committee.
138. That is, the total of the three preceding lines.
139. That is, the total of all articles referring to the House Ways and Means Committee, the Senate
Finance Committee or both.
140. That is, the ratio of all articles about all six direct expenditure committees to the number of
articles about the tax committees.




Articles about Direct Expenditure
Publication Tax Committees Committees
Dairy Foods 1 7
Coal Week 74 163
Coal 16 44
Trans. & Distribution 4 13
Aviation Daily 104 266
Oil and Gas Journal 404 121
Nat'l Petroleum News 13 4
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the number of articles referring to each particular committee of Congress. A
different view might conceivably emerge from the measurement of the
qualitative disparities in press coverage of Congress' tax and nontax
committees. Finally, some of the articles reported in Table 3 about the Ways
and Means and Finance panels refer to the nontax jurisdictions of these bodies
while some of the articles about the nontax committees refer to committee
jurisdictions unrelated to the industries I am examining, i.e., agriculture,
transportation and minerals.'42
142. For example, the House Ways and Means Committee has jurisdiction over many trade issues.
Thus, some of the articles reflected in Table 3 refer to this jurisdiction rather than Ways and Means'
authority over taxes. Similarly, the House Public Works and Transportation Committee has authority over
many public works projects which are not transportation-related.
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